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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent
-vCase No. 20646

MYRON A. HAMILTON,
Defendant-Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are as set
forth previously in Appellant's Brief at 1-4.

(See also

Respondent's Brief at 1-7). The Appellant takes this opportunity to
reply to the Respondent's Brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
(Reply to Respondent's Point I)
AN ADEQUATE RECORD HAS BEEN
PROVIDED TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONTENTIONS AND TO ENABLE THIS
COURT TO DECIDE THIS CASE.
The record in this case is massive for a non-felony
criminal case.

However, despite earnest efforts, defense counsel's

office was unable to locate the tapes of the circuit court trial in
this case.

(Appellant's Brief at 3 n. 1 ) . These tapes were

apparently the only portion of the extensive proceedings in both the
circuit and district courts which was not provided to this Court.
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In spite of this and the fact that the State was able to locate (and
presumably listen to) the missing tapes, the State still complains
that the Appellant has supplied an inadequate record.

<

(Respondent's

Brief at 8-9 and 9, n.l). However, as will be demonstrated below,
i

this complaint is invalid.
First, if an inadequacy of the record does exist, it
affects only the trial stage of the proceedings which occurred in
the circuit court.

The complete record of the first appellate stage

i

of the proceedings, which occurred in the district court, is before
this Court.

Therefore, Mr. Hamilton's contention that he was denied

assistance of appellate counsel in the district court is untarnished
by any inadequacy of the record claimed by the State.
However, the Appellant contends that the record from the
circuit court proceedings is adequate.

To support this contention,

one need look no further than the State's brief.

That brief

contains a detailed chronological description of the proceedings in
this case which was gleaned from the available record.
(Respondent's Brief at 3-7). Further, the State's brief cites with
great specificity particular instances in the existent record which
the State claims support its substantive allegations of propriety of
the proceedings.

(See, for example, Respondent's Brief at 11-21).

Finally, the State concludes one of its points by declaring that
"although defendant did not provide an adequate record of the entire
court proceedings nor a transcript of the trial, it is, however,
clear from the documents before this Court that . . . [the
- 2 -
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<

proceedings below were proper.] (Respondent's Brief at 17). Indeed,
the State's own substantive argument seems to undermine its claim
that the record is inadequate.
Further, as the record extant clearly shows, Mr. Hamilton
was denied (and did not waive) assistance of counsel not only at
trial but at critical pre-trial proceedings in the circuit court.
(R.468, 469, 470-471, 484, 493, 514-516, January 11, 1984
transcript).

The right to

assistance of counsel attaches to all

critical stages of a criminal proceeding, not just to the actual
trial.

Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), Coleman v. Alabama,

399 U.S.I (1970).

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), the

United States Supreme Court stated that an accused "requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him.n

Clearly, the record establishes that Mr. Hamilton was

deprived of the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him" in the circuit court.

Even if the record

is inadequate with respect to the trial itself, the record is
adequate with respect to other proceedings in the circuit court.

POINT II
(Reply to Respondent's Points II, III, and IV)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO APPOINT AN
ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT
THE APPELLANT AND IN NOT
OBTAINING A WAIVER OF THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
In his opening brief, Appellant raised two issues, both of
which concerned the denial of the right of assistance of counsel.
" 3 ~
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The first issue concerned the denial of assistance of counsel at the
trial level in the circuit court.

(Appellantfs Brief at 6-11).

response to this contention, the State advances three claims:

In
(1)

that the Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
his right to counsel (Respondent's Brief, Point II, at 9-17); (2)
that the trial court properly found a waiver (Respondent's Brief,
Point III, at 17-22)-, and (3) that the district court properly
addressed the issue on appeal (Respondent's Brief, Point IV, at
22-25).

The facts of the case, as well as the case law, simply do

not support the conclusions reached by the State.
With respect to the issues concerning Mr. Hamilton's
supposed waiver of his right to assistance of counsel, the State
sites numerous instances in which it declares that Mr. Hamilton knew
he was waiving his right to counsel in the circuit court.

The State

concludes that the "totality of circumstances" demonstrate such a
waiver.

(Respondent's Brief at 21-22).

The simple fact remains,

however, that the State can point to no instance in the record where
the trial judge asked Mr. Hamilton if he was waiving his right to
counsel.

The State cannot even cite to an instance where the trial

judge warned Mr. Hamilton that his continued handling of the case
without either procuring or requesting counsel would be deemed a
waiver of the right to counsel. The State cannot cite such
instances because they did not occur.

The State declares that the

trial court "could only beg defendant to get counsel."
(Respondent's Brief at 17).

However, the State does not provide any

citation to the record where such "begging" occurred.

Indeed, the

State is left to conclude that "Any lack of record of extensive

- 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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waiver questioning given the defendant's obvious intent and
displeasure at being questioned, was certainly harmless error."
(Respondent's Brief at 22). In fact, virtually no questioning
occurred which directly concerned waiver.
The State further complains that waiver should be inferred
because of Mr. Hamilton's obstinance and bad faith.

However, such

obstinance cannot outweigh the responsibility that such a situation
places on a trial judge.
Several cases have discussed waiver of the right to
counsel, and from these cases, it is possible to define the
parameters of a constitutionally acceptable waiver.
waiver is a requirement in right to counsel cases.

A finding of
The necessity of

a finding that such a waiver has been made was decreed in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Besides requiring that a waiver to

right to counsel be "knowingly and intelligently" made, the Court in
that case stated:

;

,

It has been pointed out that "courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver" of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do
not presume acquiscence in the loss of
fundamental rights."
. . . The constitutional
right of an accused to be represented by counsel
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial
court, in which the accused—whose life or
liberty is at stake—is without counsel. This
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the trial judge of
determining whether there is an intelligent and
competent waiver by the accused. While an
accused may waive the right to counsel, whether
there is a proper waiver should be clearly
determined by the trial court, and it would be
fitting and appropriate for that determination to
appear upon the record. Id. at 464, 465
(emphasis added).

- 5
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In extending this protection to state criminal matters the Court in
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) stated that the evidence

|

must show that the defendant was informed specifically of his right
to the assistance of appointed or retained counsel and that he
clearly rejected such assistance.

No amount of circumstantial

<

evidence that the person may have been aware of his right to counsel
and intended to relinquish it will suffice.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 471-2 (1966).

,

Further, an adequate waiver of right to counsel which
results in an accused representing himself has additional
requirements.

In those cases, the defendant "should be made aware

of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that fhe knows what he is doing and his choice
is made with eyes open.1"

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835

(1975).
Finally, in Carnley v. Cochran, the Court stated:
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.

The record

must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show,
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and
understandingly rejected the offer.
369 U.S. at 516.

Anything less is not waiver."

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the position

that waiver will not be presumed from a silent record when important
constitutional rights are at stake.

Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 at

345 (Utah 1980) and State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 22
(1986).

- 6
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With respect to the Statefs claim that the district court
properly addressed the issue of denial of counsel at trial on
appeal, the issue is tainted by the district court's failure to
appoint counsel for Mr. Hamilton's appeal to that court.

(See,

Point III, infra).
Appellant's opening brief contends that the issue of right
to counsel was properly before the district court.
Brief at 10-11).

(Appellant's

In any event, the district court did not address

denial of the right to counsel in its decision.
Finally, this Court need not even address the issue of
denial of assistance of counsel at the trial level.

As contended in

Point III, below, and in Appellant's opening brief, Mr. Hamilton was
unrepresented in his appeal to the district court.

If this Court

determines that this denial constituted error, remand to the
district court for re-preparation and reconsideration of the
original appeal (with the assistance of counsel) would be an
appropriate remedy.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR
MR. HAMILTON ON THE FIRST APPEAL.
In his opening brief, Appellant argued that he was denied
the assistance of counsel on his first appeal to the district court;
furthermore, no waiver of the right to counsel was found by the
district court.

(Appellant's Brief at 11-14).

The State does not

respond to this issue in its brief.

- 7 -
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The right of appeal is a constitutional right in the State
of Utah.

Article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah gives

the accused the right to appeal in all cases.

Utah Code Ann.

§77-32-1 (1953/ as amended) guarantees the constitutional right of
appeal for indigent defendants.

Furthermore, the same provision

guarantees the right to representation by an attorney in the
prosecution of the first appeal of right.
In Evitts v. Lucey/ 83 L.Ed.2d 821/ 827 (1985) the Supreme
Court stated;

Nonetheless, if a State has created appellate
courts as "an integral part of the . . . system
for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence
of a defendant/" the procedures used in deciding
appeals must comport with the demands of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution. (citations omitted).
The Court stated that the Constitution demanded that the defendant
be afforded the representation of counsel in pursuing an appeal.
The Court delineated the reason for the necessity of the assistance
of counsel during the appeal process:
To prosecute the appeal/ a criminal appellant
must face an adversary proceeding that-like a
trial-is governed by intricate rules that to a
layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An
unrepresented appellant-like an unrepresented
defendant at trial - is unable to protect the
vital interests at stake. J^d. at 830.
The right to assistance of appellate counsel may be
waived.

However/ as the Court of Appeals of New Mexico noted in

State v. Lewis/ 719 P.2d 445 (N.M. App. 1986)/ the criteria for
determining waiver of appellate counsel are stringent.
the court stated:

8
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In Lewis,

Consideration of an appellant's request to act as
his own counsel on appeal necessarily involves:
(l)alerting defendant to the hazards of serving
as his own attorney and the difficulties and
complexities of the appellate process; and
(2)instructing defendant that he will be bound to
follow all applicable appellate rules, just as
any other appellant represented by counsel.
Id. at 448.

After declaring that these admonitions must appear on

the record, the court further declared that the record must reflect
"whether defendant has knowingly, intelligently and competently
elected to dispense with appellate counsel."
omitted).

_I_d. (citations

Finally, the New Mexico court stated that in the absence

of such an on-the-record waiver, the appellate court "will indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver . . . ."

_Id.

Indeed,

the court held that the right to assistance of appellate counsel
remains "until it is affirmatively shown in the record" that the
right has been waived.

Id.

at 447.

In the present case, Mr. Hamilton appealed his circuit
court convictions to the district court (R.352-358).

However, the

entire appeal process apparently transpired solely on paper.

The

record reveals no personal appearance by either party before the
district court.

Furthermore, the record reveals no instance in

which Mr. Hamilton was questioned concerning his ability to afford
an attorney for the appeal process or admonished about the hazards
of bringing his own appeal.

The record is silent with respect to a

waiver of right to assistance of appellate counsel.

Mr. Hamilton

was never informed of the availability of appointed counsel and
proceeded through the appellate process without assistance of
counsel.

These facts are unchallenged by the State.

Also

unchallenged by the State is Appellant's contention that failure to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, "
may 9
contain"errors.

I

provide an attorney on appeal (or, at least, attain a waiver of the
i

right to representation) deprived him of a fair review of his
circuit court conviction.

CONCLUSION

<

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant, Myron Hamilton,
seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to the
circuit court with an order for a new trial with the assistance of
counsel.

<

In the alternative, the appellant seeks reversal of the

district court decision on his appeal of right and remand of his
case to the district court with an order permitting a new appeal at
the district court level with the assistance of counsel,
•At

Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1986.

L.UAJCC4, C • 7u^4J2s£
CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney
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